Is a Lien Claimant Entitled to Post-Judgment Attorney Fees?

In Carl B. Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 71 (Sept. 18, 2008), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed, among other things: (1) whether NRS 108.237(1), which allows for recovery of attorney’s fees in a mechanic’s lien action, covers all fees incurred to enforce the mechanic’s lien, including those post-judgment attorney fees incidental to the lien’s enforcement through foreclosure; and (2) whether the district court erred in denying a post-judgment motion to enter satisfaction of the judgment because not all of the attorney fees were paid.  Carl B. Barney (“Barney”) contracted with Reno Construction, Inc. (“RCI”) to renovate his house.  RCI subcontracted with Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning (“Mt. Rose”) to provide equipment and services as part of the renovations.  Barney refused to pay for the work, which he determined was defective, and RCI and Mt. Rose filed mechanic’s liens against the property.  Both RCI and Mt. Rose obtained judgments and decrees of foreclosure against Barney.  Mt. Rose, prior to any foreclosure sale, garnished funds Barney held in a bank, and attempted to execute upon Barney’s personal property.  Barney filed and won a motion to exempt his bank account from execution and to quash the garnishment.  Mt. Rose sought supplemental attorney fees and costs (“First Mt. Rose Motion”); the court granted their request.  Later, Mt. Rose filed a supplemental motion (“Second Mt. Rose Motion”), seeking fees for post-judgment matters, including the judgment’s execution, the garnishment, and the release of Barney’s bank funds. 

While this supplemental motion was before the court, Barney paid Mt. Rose an amount to satisfy the judgment and the attorney fees and costs awarded in the First Mt. Rose Motion; however, Mt. Rose refused to recognize the judgment as fully satisfied.  Barney moved the district court for an order directing the clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment.  Mt. Rose opposed the motion, asserting it was willing to provide a partial satisfaction, but was entitled to additional awards of attorney fees (requested in the Second Mt. Rose Motion), and the court denied the motion.  Just over three (3) weeks after denying Barney’s motion, the court granted the Second Mt. Rose Motion for fees and costs.  Barney appealed the post-judgment orders, arguing that the court was not authorized to award attorney fees incurred after the original judgment, and, even if authorized, the fees were unreasonable.  Barney also argued the district court should have directed the clerk to enter the judgment’s satisfaction.  The Court held that NRS 108.237(1) covers not only pre-judgment fees and costs, but also costs and fees that are incidental to the lien’s enforcement.  Since the enforcement action ends only when the property is sold and the proceeds are distributed (or otherwise paid) and the lien is discharged or released, costs and fees up to this point are properly awarded (so long as they are incidental to the lien’s enforcement).  Additionally, the Court held that since Mt. Rose had a motion for attorney fees pending at the time Barney tendered payment for the judgment, Barney was only entitled to partial satisfaction of judgment, and affirmed the finding of the district court.